

## **Appendix I: Questions on Identity and Nationalism**

1. In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both? (Taiwanese, Both, Chinese)
2. Following the previous question, from the cultural perspective, do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both? (Taiwanese, Both, Chinese)
3. Regarding the potential relation between Taiwan and Mainland China, there are a few different views, which one do you agree with the most? And which one do you agree with the least? (Unification soon, Independence soon, Maintain status quo and move toward unification, Maintain status quo and move toward independence, Maintain status quo and decide what to do in the future, Maintain status quo forever)
4. People hold different feelings toward different countries. If 0 indicates dislike a lot and 10 indicates like a lot, how would you rate the following countries? (United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan)
5. Do you feel proud to be from Taiwan?
6. Which of the following things do you think is more beneficial for national interest? (Increasing export, Decreasing import)
7. Do you agree with the following statement or not: Generally speaking, Taiwan is a better country than most other countries?

## Appendix II: Party Identification and the Pro-unification/Pro-independence Variable

In the analysis, we use *Pro-unification/Pro-independence* variable to substitute party identification. The party identity variable is excluded in the survey for two reasons. First, various studies have confirmed that the pro- independence/unification attitude are the main source for voters to identify party positions (e.g., Hsieh and Niou, 1996; Chen 2000; Chu and Lin, 2001; Wu and Hsu, 2003; Niou, 2004; Fell, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Hsiao and Cheng, 2014; Cheng and Hsu, 2015; Yu and Lin 2013).

The second reason reflects some interesting observations on the polls as well as on the electoral campaigns—people become reluctant to express their support for the ruling KMT and/or its allied pan-blue parties, and many KMT candidates try to avoid using party logos on their banners in both campaigns for the 2014 and 2016 elections.<sup>1</sup> From 2011 to 2014, the support rate for the ruling KMT party has dropped from nearly 20 percent while “independent or no response” increases, and party identification for other parties is relatively stable.<sup>2</sup> Given the difficulty of identifying the pan-blue supporters who temporarily express their party identity as “independent or no response,” we decided not to include this variable in the survey.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, see Set Network, <http://www.setn.com/News.aspx?NewsID=83706>, 2015/7/7; Apple Daily, <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/realtimenews/article/new/20151203/745604/>, 2015/12/3. Accessed: 2015/12/4.

<sup>2</sup> Despite of the sharp decline on the KMT identification, the party still got 40% vote share in local elections, compared to only 22% expressing support with KMT in the Taiwan Election and Democracy Study survey. For the trend of party identification, see “Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese”, <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?class=203>.

### **Appendix III: Support for Movement Is Not Support for Trade Protectionism**

During the Sunflower Movement, it was suspected that the social basis for this movement is simply people who are in general opposed to trade openness. Our estimation result provides scientific evidence to refute this claim. We specify a model in which the *overall trade openness support* is the dependent variable (Model 4 in Table 3). There are several findings in the results. First, both *income* and *education* are statistically significant with positive signs, suggesting that people are more likely to support trade openness when they are more educated or when they lie at the upper level of the wealth ladder. These estimation results are in line with numerous other studies that have already argued that self-interest does shape people's trade preferences (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Blonigen, 2011; Chiang et al., 2013). Even though egocentric views play a small role in an individual's attitude formation toward the Sunflower Movement, it still has explanatory power on the general trade preference. Put differently, the unique relation between Taiwan and China renders trade negotiations across the Taiwan Strait deviated from other general trade agreements, making the natural determining factors losing their explanatory powers. Second, perception on income inequality has no effect at all on individuals' overall support level for trade. Taken together, the result suggests that regarding general trade preference, people are still more egocentric than sociotropic.

Third, we find that *Anti-China Feelings* is not associated with the overall support level for trade; in contrast, if one is proud to be a Taiwanese, one is more likely to have higher support for trade openness. What does this mean? It indicates that the attribute of anti-China is only factored in when people are confronted with trade issues with China. Such attribute does not have an impact on trade issues per se. Even though they might not be big in numbers, they are conceptually distinctive. On the other hand, the level of attachment to Taiwan significantly affects how an individual forms his/her general attitude toward trade in Taiwan. As mentioned, because Taiwan is an island country, the export-related industry is the driving force for higher economic development. While Taiwanese people are in general supportive of increasing exports, people who are more emotionally attached to the community are more likely to support exports than those who are less attached.

Table 3 extended: The Estimation Result

|  | Model 1:<br>Baseline   | Model 2:<br>Interaction<br>Term<br>(Sociotropic) <sup>a</sup> | Model 3:<br>Interaction<br>Term<br>(Egocentric) <sup>b</sup> | Model 4: <sup>c</sup>       |
|--|------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| DV   | Movement<br>Evaluation | Movement<br>Evaluation  | Movement<br>Evaluation                                       | Overall<br>Trade<br>Support |
| Model  | OLS                    | OLS   | OLS  | Logit                       |
| Anti-China Feelings                                      | 0.330***<br>(0.04)     | 0.332***<br>(0.04)  | 0.198<br>(0.196)   | -0.105<br>(0.06)            |
| Taiwanese Pride  | 0.120*<br>(0.05)       | 0.117*<br>(0.05)  | 0.257<br>(0.20)  | 0.189**<br>(0.07)           |
| National Chauvinism                                      | -0.017<br>(0.1)        | -0.007<br>(0.1)   | -0.02<br>(0.1)   | -0.241<br>(0.15)            |
| Taiwanese Identity                                       | 1.547***<br>(0.2)      | 1.548***<br>(0.2)   | 1.542***<br>(0.21)   | 0.362<br>(0.32)             |
| Pro-Unification<br>(reference group: the status<br>quo)  | -0.416<br>(0.26)       | -0.459+<br>(0.25)   | -0.419<br>(0.26)   | 0.342<br>(0.45)             |
| Pro-Independence<br>(reference group: the status<br>quo) | 1.611***<br>(0.2)      | 1.546***<br>(0.2)   | 1.610***<br>(0.2)  | -0.541+<br>(0.31)           |
| Urban  | -0.275<br>(0.17)       | -0.271<br>(0.17)  | -0.276<br>(0.17)   | 0.282<br>(0.27)             |
| Taipei   | 0.293<br>(0.24)        | 0.252<br>(0.24)   | 0.288<br>(0.24)  | 0.174<br>(0.4)              |
| Education  | 0.008<br>(0.03)        | 0.008<br>(0.03)   | 0.620<br>(0.10)  | 0.091+<br>(0.05)            |
| Income   | -0.016<br>(0.02)       | -0.017<br>(0.02)  | -0.016<br>(0.02)   | 0.050+<br>(0.03)            |
| Inequality Perception                                    | 0.769***<br>(0.13)     | 0.961***<br>(0.14)  | 0.762***<br>(0.13)   | -0.208<br>(0.22)            |
| Age  | -0.014+<br>(0.01)      | -0.015*<br>(0.01)   | -0.013+<br>(0.01)  | 0.006<br>(0.01)             |
| Anti-China*Inequality                                    |                        | 0.131**<br>(0.05)   |  |                             |
| Pride*Inequality   |                        | 0.057<br>(0.06)   |  |                             |
| Anti-China*Education                                     |                        |   | 0.008<br>(0.01)  |                             |

|                 |                    |                   |                  |                 |
|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Pride*Education |                    |                   | -0.009<br>(0.01) |                 |
| _cons           | 0.055***<br>(0.91) | 5.09***<br>(0.61) | -0.782<br>(1.75) | 0.358<br>(1.49) |
| R-sq            | 0.515              | 0.521             | 0.515            |                 |
| BIC             | 3575               | 3578              | 3587             | 559             |
| N               | 786                | 786               | 786              | 744             |

+ p<.1 \* p<.05 \*\* p<.01 \*\*\* p<.001

<sup>a</sup>To avoid the multicollinearity problem, we standardize the variables (mean-centering) that constitute the interaction terms in the analysis (*Inequality Perception*, *Anti-China Feeling*, and *Taiwanese Pride*).

<sup>b</sup>*Education*, *Anti-China Feeling*, and *Taiwanese Pride* are mean-centered to avoid the multicollinearity problem.

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