

Who Supports The Sunflower Movement? An Examination of Nationalist Sentiments¹

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Abstract

The Sunflower Movement – an occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the Congress) for twenty-four days– was an unprecedented movement in the history of Taiwan. We examine the social foundation of the Movement and explore an important factor that has long been missing in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. We divide nationalism into three dimensions: national attachment, national chauvinism, and feelings toward other countries. Using original survey data collected six months after the Movement, we find that national attachment (being proud of Taiwan) and anti-China feelings are unique dimensions and both lead to higher supports for the Sunflower Movement. National chauvinism, on the other hand, is not

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associated with supports for the Movement. Furthermore, the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. The underlying logic is when people are more nationalistic they care more about the potential social impact of expanding socio-economic exchanges with another country. These results point to the direction that it is necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigates their effects on individuals' political behaviors.

Introduction

On March 18th 2014, student-led social activists stormed into the *Legislative Yuan* (the Congress) in Taiwan for the very first time in history. The protest turned into a 24-day occupation of the Legislative Yuan and was named “The Sunflower Movement.” Mass protests against government signing a service trade agreement (CSSTP) with China triggered an eventful occupation.² The Movement is not only an unprecedented social movement in Taiwan; in the global context, media listed it as one of the most “unforgettable symbols from an extraordinary year of protests.”³

The immediate impact of the Sunflower Movement was to successfully postpone the ratification of the service trade agreement with China. It has become a critical event in the history of Taiwan, the long-term impacts of which are to be evaluated for the years to come. For example, many observers and media illustrate that this event was highly influential to the

² This agreement is estimated to influence more than 4 million jobs and industries worth approximately \$400 billion of GDP (Source is from CIER 2013. *The Evaluation of the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services*. Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research). However, the ruling Nationalist Party (*Kuomintang*, KMT) at the time attempted to manipulate the review process in the legislative body. For more details of the event, see <http://4am.tw> (This website was created and maintained by volunteers). For some comments and observations of the event, see for example: Cole, 2014; Cole, 2015; Wright, 2014; Rowen, 2015. There is a website collecting series of articles on this event: “Big Page of Sunflower Movement Links”, <http://michaelturton.blogspot.com/p/in-which-dave-brown-of-ait-who-cant.html> (Accessed: 15/05/29).

³ Along with other big events such as the Euromaidan in Ukraine, Bring-back-our-girls in Nigeria, and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong. See Charlotte Alfred, 2014. “8 Unforgettable Symbols From An Extraordinary Year Of Protests.” *The Huffington Post*.

local election in November 2014, in which the ruling KMT suffered a landslide defeat.⁴ Given that the movement has had a profound impact on mass political attitudes as well as the political landscape in Taiwan, it is essential to tease out the social basis of this unprecedented movement.

There have been several unproven claims, laid out by the media, politicians, and the civil society, about the social foundation of this Movement.⁵ On one hand, many people argue that citizens were mobilized by the opposition party to support the movement due to the long-existing anti-China attitudes (*feng zhong bi fan*) and pro-independence attitudes.⁶ On the other hand, people's attitude on a trade deal with China may be determined by individuals' concern of economic benefits, as well as its impacts on the society, especially rising income inequality.⁷

⁴ The election was held on November 29th, 2014, for special municipality mayors, county magistrates, and city mayors. The KMT only won six out of 22 seats, compared to 15 previously, and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 13 seats with a 7-seat-gain, not including the capital Taipei City Mayor, an independent who was endorsed by the DPP. See Hsieh (2015).

⁵ For some keywords of supporters and protesters on social media, see Wu and Hsieh 2014. Also, the government hosted 16 hearings *after* the signing of the CSSTP and there were various concerns from representatives from different industries. For videos and notes for each hearing, see "Reviewing Fu-Mao" website: <http://review-fumao.logdown.com>. Accessed: 07/21/15.

⁶ It is true that some major leaders of the student/social groups are also active in anti-China or pro-independence social activities. However, this Movement was not supported but not mobilized by the opposition parties. The opposition party heavyweights were even marginalized in the Movement when they express interests of joining the event. See Ho (2015); Cole (2015).

⁷ These arguments are in line with the literature that both economic self-interest and symbolic politics matter when people forming attitudes toward cross-Strait socio-economic exchanges (Lin 2005; Keng et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009).

In this paper, we theoretically address a major shortcoming in the literature of Taiwanese politics: nationalism. In the context of the Sunflower Movement, one might think of the “anti-China feeling” as one of the main motivations of the mass protest, while others argue that the general basis of the movement is constituted of pro-Taiwan supporters. We contend that there are different dimensions of nationalism. “Loving Taiwan” and “anti-China” are two related but different sentiments under the umbrella of nationalism and both dimensions matter for the support of the Sunflower Movement. However, there has been no research distinguishing those feelings so far. Surveys often include important factors such as people’s Taiwanese/Chinese identity, father’s ethnic origin, and attitudes on independence or unification, which are direct measurements of identity, not of nationalism.

We argue that nationalism has three dimensions. The first is national pride –being proud of one’s citizenship or attached to one’s country. The second is national chauvinism –feeling one’s country is superior to others’ in general. The third is feelings toward another country (see e.g., Herrmann et al., 2009). While national chauvinism may not be associated with the protest against an economic agreement with a specific country, national attachment (the degree of loving Taiwan) and negative feelings toward China (the level of anti-China feeling) factor in, respectively, attitude formation of the Taiwanese people toward the Sunflower Movement. Furthermore, we argue that the effects of nationalism sentiments are conditioned

on individuals' sociotropic view: more sociotropic one is, the impact of nationalist feeling is stronger when it comes to supporting the movement. The underlying logic is that nationalism sentiment makes one more aware of the national issue and is more willing to do something for the nation (Huddy and Khatib, 2007).

We test our hypotheses using an original survey data collected six months after the movement in late September to early October in 2014. The novelty of this investigation is that we focus on the effect of nationalism and distinguish different dimensions of it. We control for Taiwanese identity and unification/independence attitudes and tease out the effect of nationalism attitudes on the Sunflower Movement.

After controlling for the standard variables (e.g.: Taiwanese identity and pro-independence attitudes), we find evidence to support our hypotheses. First, nationalism plays a significant role when people evaluate the Movement. We find that people who dislike China and being proud of Taiwan tend to support the Movement. Also, the correlation between the three dimensions of nationalism is low, suggesting that they are indeed unique aspects.

Second, we find that the impact of nationalism is contingent on sociotropic views. People who express higher levels of nationalism are more responsive to the issue of rising income inequality when evaluating the Movement. Furthermore, individuals holding negative feelings toward China are affected more by the national economic environment than

those who hold more positive feelings toward Taiwan. Put differently, in the context of trading with China, the aspect of nationalist feeling against China is especially elastic to the possible social outcomes brought by intensifying trade relations. In sum, these results show that it is necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals' political attitudes.

The organization of the article is as follows. The next section discusses the social context in which the Sunflower Movement took place. In the third section, we elaborate different dimensions of nationalism, linking the Movement back to the existing literature, and generate our working hypotheses. In the fourth and fifth section, we present the data, our measurement, and the empirical findings. We conclude with the implications.

The Case of Cross-Strait Relations

Cross-Strait relations have been greatly improved since 2008.⁸ However, trading with China is still seen as “trading with the enemy” for many Taiwanese people due to national

⁸ Officially, the cross-Strait relations have been an ongoing civil war since 1949 when the KMT was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and retreated to Taiwan. To date, the People's Republic of China (PRC) still views Taiwan as a renegade province, while Taiwan's government, formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), tries to maintain *de facto* independence and claims sovereignty over Mainland China. Since 2008, Taiwan and China have signed more than 20 agreements, including cooperation on tourism, investment, financial sector, crime fighting, intelligence right protection, transportation, and free trade. For discussion on the improvements of cross-Strait relations, see, for example, Bush, 2013; Li, 2014; Cabestan and deLisle, 2014.

security concerns (Chan, 2009; Chen et al., 2009; Yu and Lin, 2013; Magcamit and Tan, 2015; Cabestan and deLisle, 2014). Before the Ma Ying-Jeou Administration, trade and investment between the two sides were banned *de jure* despite the fact that the percentage of Taiwanese exports to China has consistently been nearly 40% for decades, and more than 60% of outward investments from Taiwan have gone to China since 1991.⁹

The two sides signed a free trade agreement in 2010 –the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)– and officially lifted the trade ban. The Ma Administration proceeded with the Cross-Strait Service Trade Pact (CSSTP) with China in 2013. However, to avoid potential societal blowback, the administration refused to reveal information about the negotiation and the KMT legislators boycotted almost every review opportunity for the CSSTP in the legislative body. On March 17th 2014, the legislator who hosted the committee declared that the CSSTP had been ratified by the legislature without any review. This abrupt announcement led to the occupation of the legislature the next evening, which ignited a month-long social protest.

Against this backdrop, the eruption of the Sunflower Movement contains several components. First, it was a protest against a service trade agreement, which will influence

⁹ Statistics of cross-Strait trade can be found on the website of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council <http://www.mac.gov.tw>. The latest number on trade proportions with china since 2001 to September 2014 can be found in here: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/259_2.pdf. The number for outward investment is here: http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/259_10.pdf. Accessed: 2015/05/13.

more than 4 million jobs and industries worth \$400 billion GDP.¹⁰ Second, the trade partner is China which, on the one hand, is a close trade partner of Taiwan but, on the contrary, a national security threat for the Taiwanese.

Who Supports the Sunflower Movement?

Nationalism and the China factor

Cross-Strait relations between Taiwan and China have always been a fundamental political issue in Taiwan (Wu, 2009; Yu and Lin, 2013). The Sunflower Movement is a collective action that is against the CSSTP, which, on the one hand, is a trade agreement but, on the other hand, is a treaty with China whose ultimate intention is to unify Taiwan politically. There have been numerous studies that associate the China factor and political behavior of the Taiwanese people (Lin, 2005; Keng et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009).

Symbolic politics –including nationalistic attitudes, Chinese/Taiwanese identity, unification/independence attitudes, parents’ provincial origin (ethnicity), and party identity– are argued as partial drivers of people’s attitudes toward China. Drawing evidence from existing survey data, researchers confirm that people who view themselves as Taiwanese,

¹⁰ CIER (2013). *The Evaluation of the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services*.

who are pro-independent, and who identify themselves as the pan-green parties supporters,¹¹ tend to oppose expanding cross-Strait exchanges (Keng et al., 2006; Lin, 2005). Even when the trade ban was officially lifted and cross-Strait tension greatly eased since 2008, these factors still condition people's evaluations toward the cross-Strait exchanges (Chen et al., 2009).

However, while researchers focus more on the effect of national identity and of unification/independence attitudes, nationalism –its different dimensions and potential effects– has been neglected in the existing literature. Moreover, nationalism, if mentioned at all, is usually operationalized as national identity in Taiwan's context, which is vulnerable to criticism of conflating concepts. Most surveys only include a "Taiwanese identity" variable -which asks whether respondents think of themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese, or both- and use the identity variable as a proxy for nationalism. However, identity is conceptually different from nationalism. It is very likely that two people who identify themselves as Taiwanese may view their connection to the nation differently.

Established scholarship on nationalism already shows that nation-regarding attitudes can be separated into several related but distinct components (Smith and Jarkko, 1998;

¹¹ Taiwan's party system has been centered on the issue of unification/independence. The pan-blue camp consists of KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and the New Party, which is pro-unification and supports expanding cross-Strait exchange. The pan-Green camp contains the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and other pro-independence parties.

Karasawa, 2002; De Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Herrmann et al., 2009; Solt, 2011). First, nationalism can be measured by attachment, i.e., how close people feel toward their country and how much they feel they belong to the community. The level of pride an individual takes to be a citizen of a country is a direct and common proxy for the degree of attachment to that particular country.¹² Second, nationalism can be measured through one's feeling of superiority for one's own country over others in general, which is often dubbed as national chauvinism. Third, it contains the negative feelings toward a specific country. Taken together, studies have shown that these sentiments are conceptually distinct and exhibit diverse effects on public opinion.¹³ Therefore, it is necessary to separate different dimensions of nationalism and their potential effects on how people view the Sunflower Movement.

In the context of cross-Strait politics and the Sunflower Movement, national pride and negative feelings toward China should be most salient among the nationalist sentiments. First, national pride measures the sense of Taiwanese belonging. Attachment to one's country

¹² Another approach is to measure people's reaction to national symbols, such as a national flag or national anthem, and how people consent with cultural conceptions of a nation, e.g., language and religion.

¹³ For example, Herrmann et al. (2009) find that people's attachment to the nation in Italy and in the United States leads to more support for international cooperation options when it comes to humanitarian crisis issue, whereas such cooperative attitude is not associated with negative feeling about foes. National attachment is also believed to be a strong predictor of civic involvement (Huddy and Khatib, 2007). Those who are more attached to the nation tend to have higher level of political attention and knowledge, and they are more likely to turn out and vote.

makes individuals more aware of the national issue and more willing to do something for the nation. As a civil protest that aims at correcting the procedural justice (for signing deals with China), expressing the dissatisfaction on the administration, and defending of the down-sides of the CSSTP, the effect of “loving Taiwan” should positively lead to support for the Movement.

Second, we contend that national chauvinism does not factor into the evaluation of the Movement because there is a clear target in this event, that is, China. According to Herrmann et al. (2009), chauvinism attitude may influence people’s opinion on the foreign policies in general, such as military actions and aid programs, but not on opinions of policies toward a specific country. Those who exhibit national chauvinism may have a certain negative feelings about free trade in general, but it is not a determinant when people evaluate a civil activity about anti-China.¹⁴

Third, although the role of chauvinism may be marginalized when it comes to China, the anti-China feeling directly measures the extent to which people view the Chinese government. This sentiment consists of emotions, trust, and evaluation on the socio-economic exchanges —“functional relationship” in Herrmann et al. (2009)’ words— between

¹⁴ In fact, Taiwan is an island-state, which means that trade openness is a necessity for economy. Therefore, national chauvinism does not necessarily leads to opposing trade openness. Due to space limit, we do not focus on this topic in the paper but we do include the discussion and a model on the online appendix.

one's own country and the specific country, China in this case. If an individual does not trust China's government or giving China a negative evaluation, it is highly possible that she will support the Movement.

This paper examines the effects of these main components of nationalism on the support of the Sunflower Movement. We hypothesize that national pride and negative feelings toward China increase individuals' support of the Sunflower Movement:¹⁵

Hypothesis 1-1: People who exhibit higher levels of national attachment, being proud as a Taiwanese, tend to support the Sunflower Movement.

Hypothesis 1-2: People who feel higher levels of negativity toward China, tend to support the Sunflower Movement.

Conditional Effect of Nationalism on Sociotropic View

The importance of nationalism should be amplified even more if we take the issue of rising income inequality into account. Scholars argue that attachment to a nation "injects emotional fuel" to the sentiments generated by the functional relationship with other

¹⁵ In addition to the two hypotheses, we do not expect to see a relationship between national chauvinism and support of the Sunflower Movement, while it may influence people's attitudes toward trade openness in general.

countries (Herrmann et al., 2009), leading people to like or hate another country more intensely after evaluating the pros and cons of social and economic exchanges between nations.

A channel through which individuals understand the functional relationship with another country is the national economic environment. Besides individuals' personal material benefits and symbolic politics, scholars find that people often evaluate the overall impact of a trade policy, especially whether it benefits the overall economy and whether it induces income inequality (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009; Lü et al., 2012). This approach suggests that people tend to form their policy preferences by national-level information, i.e., perceptions of how a given policy affects the nation as a whole (Mansfield and Mutz, 2009). If people perceive that the country as a whole will benefit economically from a trade agreement, citizens tend to support free trade regardless of their individual benefit.

Regarding national level information on economic and trade policies, people are not only concerned about the size of the pie, but also about how the pie is distributed. Scholars find that people tend to be inequality-averse, and they often evaluate the impact of trade on the workers in the whole industry (Lü et al., 2012). Several studies using survey experiments find that information on winners and losers of free trade substantially affect people's attitudes (e.g., Lü et al., 2012; Ehrlich and Hearn, 2014). In general, people do care about the

possibility of rising income inequality and/or job insecurity under certain trade deals, and they support trade openness more if the society or the government compensates losers.

Since the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2010, the linkage between rising inequality and cross-Strait economic ties has become more and more salient. Studies show that cross-Strait trade openness results in increasing income inequality between classes. The employers who invest in China are classes that benefited from trade with China, while the wealth gap between them and the local employees plus the self-employed in Taiwan is widening (Lin, 2015b; Lin and Hu, 2011; Wong, 2010). Taiwan's trade openness with China and the increasing inequality level has led to declining class mobility, shrinking subjective social status, and rising political discontent among middle- and lower- class people toward the government. Lin (2015b) argues that rising class inequality partially explains the emergence of the Sunflower Movement.

In the existing studies, there is a question that has not yet been addressed. Specifically, is the effect of inequality homogeneous across different social groups? Who cares more about the effect the rising inequality when evaluating the impact of a particular policy? We argue that the impact of nationalism sentiments should condition the effect of income inequality perceptions on trading with China (and on the Sunflower Movement) because those who are more attached to Taiwan and who feel more negatively toward China should be more aware

of the detrimental impacts of a trade policy. In other words, the perception of income inequality will have different marginal effects for people with various levels of nationalism sentiments.

Hypothesis 2-1: People concerned about rising income inequality tend to support the Sunflower Movement more as they tend to notice the negative effect of the CSSTP.

Hypothesis 2-2: The effect of income inequality perception is larger for those who have higher levels of nationalism, including both national pride and negative feeling toward China.

Self-Interest and Cross-Strait Exchanges

Protesting against the service trade deal with China is an essential factor that motivates the Movement. If we leave out the political effect of trading with China and treating the CSSTP as a pure free trade deal,¹⁶ conventional wisdom suggests that people are economically self-interested. People concern about their material benefits when it comes to trade policy preferences. Direct beneficiaries of free trade — regardless of whether the

¹⁶ This is the main argument the Administration tries to make in order to persuade people that this agreement is necessary for Taiwan's economy.

determinant is endowed factors, skill specificity, or levels of education— would support an open economy and free trade agreements (Rogowski, 1987; Alt et al., 1996; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Hiscox 2006, Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012). In the context of the Sunflower Movement, economic endowments may be an important determinant of people's attitudes on the anti-CSSTP event.

However, in contrast to the conditional effect of nationalism on sociotropic view, there should be no interactions between self-interest and nationalism because nationalism makes people more aware of the society or country as a whole but may not influence the material personal interest. We briefly explain the two primary causal mechanisms of the egocentric view and why it does not condition the effect of nationalism.

First, the factor endowment theory illustrates that a country's primitive factor endowment determines who will favor or oppose trade openness. The abundant factor owner or producers who use intensively the abundant factor should support free trade since they can benefit from exporting factor-abundant products. In short, workers with less (more) skill living in a skill-abundant (skill deficient) country will experience real income declines from freer trade, so they will support protectionism over free trade (Blonigen, 2011).

The second theory is the specific factors model. It argues that people's preferences for trade policy are tied to their specific sector regardless of whether individuals have abundant

factors or not. The characteristics of the industry a worker works for determining how her income varies with trade openness because it is difficult for workers to move between industries and switch their skills under the impact of trade. Therefore, the competitiveness of the industries to which labor is attached determines individuals' preferences regarding trade (Alt et al., 1996; Hiscox, 2002).

Later studies find that both personal and industrial endowment arguments work interchangeably in reality (Hiscox, 2006; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Taken together, people consider their factor endowment, or their "competitiveness," in the job market as the reason to support trade openness or not. This characteristic is often measured by their education levels, income levels, and occupation.

According to the theories of nationalism, no matter how the level of self-interest one exhibits, the effect of nationalism sentiments will not vary when people evaluate the movement. Individuals' skill level and one's competitiveness in the job market will not interact with nationalism, which "injects emotional fuel to the sentiments generated by the functional relationship with other countries" (Herrmann et al., 2009). National pride and feeling toward China may show up especially when it comes to issues related to the whole society but less on material personal interests. Therefore, we hypothesize that this egocentric concern will not condition the effect of nationalism sentiments.

Hypothesis 3: For the evaluation of the Sunflower Movement, the effect of holding various levels of egocentric concern, or factor endowments, will remain the same for those who exhibit different levels of nationalism sentiments.

Data and Measurement

To test our hypotheses, we conducted an original survey from September 30th to October 8th in 2014. A total of 831 samples were collected.¹⁷ The survey was administrated through the Pollcracy Lab (PL), which is hosted by the Election Study Center (ESC) at the National Cheng-chi University in Taiwan.¹⁸

The PL is an online panel that consists of more than 10,000 panelists. All panelists are recruited through random digit dialing (RDD), the same method as telephone interviewing. In other words, it is a probability-based panel, covering the Taiwanese population aged 20 years and older.¹⁹

¹⁷ For the data replication, please visit <http://weitingyen.com/papers/>. We also attach an appendix for the exact wording of the survey.

¹⁸ The ESC has been in charge of carrying out a long-term, large-scale survey research project in Taiwan (Taiwan Election and Democracy Study; TEDS) that is funded by the Department of Humanities and Social Science of the Ministry of Science and Technology.

¹⁹ Even though the PL is a probability-based panel, selection bias may still exist. The ESC compares the online panel and surveyed panelists with the 2010 census data and the result shows that the online panel is not different from the Taiwanese population in terms of gender and of geographic composition. However, with respect to geographic composition, even though the panel reflects the national population, there is still an

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable of main interest is people's evaluation of this movement. In our survey, we ask the respondents to rate the Sunflower Movement on a scale from 1 to 10.²⁰ While 1 indicates that the respondent has extremely negative feelings toward the movement, 10 indicates extremely positive feelings toward the movement. The frequency distribution of the dependent variable is shown in Figure 1. Out of 10 points, the average response is at 5.8 with a standard deviation of 3.2, indicating a widespread variation of people's feelings toward the movement. The bi-polar individual attitudes are also manifested in the two humps at score 1 and 10 in Figure 1; 30% of the respondents express either extremely negative or extremely positive feelings toward the Sunflower Movement.

[Figure 1 is here]

Nationalism

urban bias among the surveyed panelists. In other words, a digital gap may exist in the online survey, but the level of bias is no more than the level of bias that exists in conventional telephone interviewing surveys (Yu, 2012).

²⁰ The specific wording of the question is as follows: "In Taiwan, the incident of Occupying the Legislative Yuan (a.k.a the Sunflower Movement) took place between March and April. How do you feel about the whole movement? Please rate this movement."

The central focus is to tease out the role of nationalism in cross-Strait relation. Unlike existing survey data that rarely cover the issue of nationalism, our research measures nationalism in a more direct way. We distinguish various dimensions of nationalism; i.e., we separate people's positive feelings toward Taiwan (*Taiwanese Pride*) from people's negative feelings toward China (*Anti-China Feelings*). Also, *National Chauvinism*, feelings of superiority over other countries, is another factor that may independently influence individuals' political attitudes.

Taiwanese Pride Taiwanese pride is measured through the responses to the following question, "Do you feel proud to be from Taiwan?" People choose on a 10 point scale depending on how proud they feel as a Taiwanese. The higher the score is, the more people feel positively attached to Taiwan. As previously noted in the theory part and later elaboration of Table 1, a higher sense of Taiwanese pride does not automatically make an individual look down upon China.

Anti-China Feelings This variable is constructed based on the feeling thermometer toward China. On a scale from 0 to 10, each respondent is asked to give scores to different countries (the United States, China, Japan, South Korea,

Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan). We average the scores respondents give to each country (except for Taiwan and China) as their baseline feelings and subtract their scores given to China from the average scores, standardizing the feeling thermometers.²¹ The total range of this variable is from -10 to 10, with 0 being no particular positive/negative feelings toward China and a higher score means being more anti-China. The mean value is 1.6, indicating that Taiwanese people on average feel slightly more negative toward China. It is hypothesized that the more you dislike China, the more supportive you are toward the Sunflower Movement.

National Chauvinism Feeling superiority over other countries is measured by the following question, “Generally speaking, Taiwan is a better country than most other countries.” Responses range from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “disagree strongly” and 5 being “agree strongly.” The mean response is 3.89 with a standard deviation 0.92. On average, our respondents view Taiwan as a better country than most other countries in the world.

²¹ By taking into account the baseline feelings toward other countries, we can compare across respondents with higher levels of certainty. Scholars have suggested researchers to standardize the feeling thermometers due to the fact that people’s feeling scores vary greatly across individuals: some people are just “warmer” than others; or, some people just give out score with wider/narrower ranges (Knight, 1984; Giles and Evans, 1985; Wilcox et al., 1989).

Taiwanese Identity

In order to make sure that the issue of identity is different from that of nationalism, and that nationalism has its independent effect on cross-Strait relations, we include *Taiwanese Identity* (whether you identify yourself as a Taiwanese or as a Chinese) as a control variable.²² *Taiwanese Identity* is measured as a dummy variable. Respondents are coded as 1 if they answer “Taiwanese,” as opposed to “Both” or “Chinese,” in the standard identity question. In the survey, 59% of the respondents identify themselves as Taiwanese.²³ Table 1 displays the correlation coefficients between “Taiwanese Identity”, “National Chauvinism”, “Taiwanese Pride”, and “Anti-China Feelings.” The simple correlation table lends strong supports to the argument that these three aspects of nationalism are conceptually different and capture attitudes that cannot be caught by the usual identity variable.²⁴

²² For the discussion of concept, see Wu (2005).

²³ This is in line with the percentage showed up in the long-term tracking in surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU. See “Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese”, <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?class=203>.

²⁴ First, the correlation between pride and identity is only 0.16, and so is the correlation between pride and anti-China feelings. It suggests that people who have no trouble identifying themselves as Taiwanese are not necessarily more attached to Taiwan. By the same token, feeling negative toward China does not make one automatically feel more positive toward Taiwan. They are distinctive feelings that demand different conceptualizations. Second, even though Taiwanese identity is indeed associated with greater anti-China feelings, the correlation is only as high as 0.48. In the same vein, for those who are more attached to Taiwan, they are more likely to feel that Taiwan is better than other countries. The correlation is 0.42. To sum up, the correlation coefficient table suggests that identity is by no means a good proxy for neither aspects of nationalism. We also run statistical tests to check for the possible multicollinearity problem, and we are confident that multicollinearity problem does not exist. The mean VIF is 1.28.

[Table 1 is here]

Pro-unification/Pro-independence

The other important control variable in the context of Taiwan is the attitude toward unification and/or independence. We employ a standard 6-category question for respondents to choose from on the potential relation between Taiwan and China: to be unified soon, maintaining status quo and moving toward unification, maintaining status quo and leaving the decision in the future, maintaining status quo forever, maintaining status quo and moving toward independence, to be independent soon. We create two dummy variables for people who are more pro-unification (*Pro-unification*) and those more pro-independence (*Pro-independence*). We have the “maintaining status quo” as the reference group.²⁵ With respect to the estimation result, we expect to see that people who are more pro-independent (as opposed to maintaining the status quo) should be associated with higher support for the Sunflower Movement.

²⁵ Pro-unification includes “to be unified soon” and “maintaining status quo and moving toward unification”; pro-independence includes “maintaining status quo and moving toward independence” and “to be independent soon”. Maintaining status quo includes “maintaining status quo and leaving the decision in the future” and “maintaining status quo forever”.

In the analysis, we use *Pro-unification/Pro-independence* variable to substitute party identification. The main reason for excluding the party identity variable is that various studies have confirmed that the pro- independence/unification attitudes are the main source for voters to identify party positions (e.g., Niou, 2004; Yu and Lin 2013; Hsiao and Cheng, 2014). We include a detailed discussion about this choice in the online appendix.²⁶

Inequality Perception (Sociotropic View)

The perception of the inequality level of society is measured by the degree to which respondents agree to the following statement, “*In the past few years, the problem of income inequality has become more and more serious in Taiwan.*” On the scale from 1 to 5, the average response of Taiwanese people is 4.58, which shows that most Taiwanese people are concerned about income inequality. In addition, Taiwanese people consider income inequality as one major social issue that needs to be addressed by the government. In the same survey, 73% of the people who agree that income inequality has become more serious also consider that it is the government’s responsibility to tackle this social issue. We will use this measure to test whether Taiwanese people care more about the overall impact of trading with China than their individual well-being.

²⁶ Please visit <http://weitingyen.com/papers/>.

Self Interest (Egocentric View)

As indicated by political economists, being winners or being losers under economic integration leads individuals to hold opposite opinions toward a trade agreement. In the context of trading with China, low skilled labor in Taiwan ought to be the group of people who are hurt the most if Taiwan is to increase economic integration with China.²⁷ To test whether the individual position in the labor market factors in his/her evaluation toward trade openness with China, we follow the literature of political economy and mainly operationalize skill level by respondents' educational level, while we also control for the income level.²⁸ Regarding education levels, we use the total years of education as a proxy for how educated an individual is. In Taiwan, the average respondent has 16 years of education (starting from elementary school), indicating that most of the respondents in our sample have bachelor degrees.

²⁷ This is the case especially because low-skilled workers will be less mobile than their high-skill counterparts. With more businessmen moving their factories to Mainland China for cheaper labor workers, low-skilled workers in Taiwan who have less mobility are doomed to lose their job opportunities. Their disadvantaged economic positions make them less supportive of trade openness with China.

²⁸ Income level may not be a good proxy for factor endowment because personal income cannot reflect personal wealth, nor distinguishing capitalists from non-capitalists. In this paper, it is measured by the monthly revenue of a respondent's household. For the literature of political economy on supporting trade openness, see for example, Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2006; Fordham and Kleinberg, 2012.

Overall Trade Openness Support

In the empirical test, we also want to show that support for the Sunflower Movement cannot be interpreted directly as the support level for trade openness. To that end, we include a variable for overall trade openness support. It is measured by the response of respondents to the following question, “Which one of the following things do you think is most beneficial for national interest? (1) Increasing exports (2) Decreasing imports”. We create a dummy variable with 1 indicating people in favor of the former, expanding trade volume. In the main model, we include the overall support for trade openness as our control variable to make sure that people’s attitudes toward the trade agreement with China are not entirely driven by people’s general support for trade openness. In order to illustrate why signing the trade agreement with China is different from signing other trade agreements, we will also run models in which the *overall trade openness support* is the dependent variable. Please see the online appendix for the estimation result.

Other Variables

Urban is a dummy variable that documents whether the respondent lives in a big city or not; *Taipei* is another dummy variable that documents whether the respondent lives in Taipei City (the capital) or not. Both variables are included to control for the possibility that the

result is mainly driven by people who live in urban areas or the capital (Keng and Chen, 2003; Lee and Hsu 2002). *Age* documents how old a respondent is.²⁹ For descriptive statistics of all variables, please see Table 2.

[Table 2 is about here]

Findings

The first set of hypotheses is whether different aspects of nationalism matter for the support of the Sunflower Movement and whether the effect of nationalism is independent of that of national identity. As mentioned, the advantage of our survey is to distinguish the negative feelings toward China from the positive feelings toward Taiwan. Even though observationally anti-China and pro-Taiwan may both lead to higher support for the Sunflower Movement, they are conceptually two different groups based on different motivations.

We find that nationalism does matter, even after controlling for individual national identity (Model 1 in Table 3). About *Anti-China Feelings*, we find that anti-China does

²⁹ Literature on the generational effect on political attitudes is huge. Studies show that there are certain age and/or generational effects in Taiwan's politics, especially on attitudes toward democracy and on national identity (i.e., the independence and unification issue, which is highly correlated with party identity and Taiwanese identity). Regardless of the causal mechanisms, there should be a correlation between generation and the support level of the Movement. For the latest discussion and literature review, see Lin (2015a).

increase support for the movement. However, in the same model, we also find that national attachment toward Taiwan (*Taiwan Pride*) accounts for part of the variation after controlling for the level of anti-China sentiment, identity and the attitude toward unification/independence. National chauvinism, as expected, has little predicting power for the support of the Sunflower Movement. Our empirical evidence suggests that people who are anti-China belong to a distinctive social group that is different from the pro-Taiwan social group. Both negative feelings toward China and national attachment (positive feelings toward Taiwan) factor in individual attitude formation. Furthermore, in the same model, *Taiwanese Identity* is associated very strongly with the support for the movement,³⁰ which suggests that, besides the widely used Taiwanese identity and unification/independence variables, nationalism also has a role in shaping individual attitudes toward cross-Strait relations.

The second set of hypotheses is whether the effect of nationalism is conditional. To be more precise, our argument is that if one is more nationalistic, she would be more responsive to the overall influence of trade on her community. In other words, individuals who are more nationalistic are also more sociotropic than egocentric. Because some of the concerns expressed in the society during the CSSTP negotiation question on whether the negotiated

³⁰ On a 10-point scale, having Taiwanese identity, on average, increases one's evaluation toward the movement by 1.53 points and *Pro-Independence* has the same level of effect. Compared to people who prefer the status quo, pro-independent attitudes increases the support for the movement by 1.55 points. In contrast, *Pro-Unification* leads to a decrease in the support level.

service trade agreement benefits the general public or only a subtle group of business people,³¹ we suspect that individuals who are more nationalistic would take a more sociotropic view on the CSSTP as well. That is, nationalistic individuals are even more supportive of the Sunflower Movement than non-nationalist individuals if the undesired societal impact is perceived.

We evaluate such claim in Model 1 and Model 2 (Table 3) and illustrate the effect more vividly in Figure 2. It shows that sociotropic view has an independent effect on the support for the Sunflower Movement (Model 1). For individuals who consider that inequality has become a more serious issue in Taiwan, they show higher support for the Sunflower Movement. The result suggests that people can care unconditionally about how the economic pie will be distributed at the national level when they evaluate the CSSTP.

On the claim that more nationalistic individuals have more sociotropic views on the trade deal, we add two interaction terms to model it (Model 2). The first term is the interaction between *Anti-China Feelings* and *Inequality Perception*, and the other is *Taiwanese Pride* and *Inequality Perception*. Our expectation is that the effect of nationalism should be stronger among people who think inequality is getting worse in Taiwan.

Table 3 displays the results. Because we usually learn very little information from a

³¹ Wu Chieh-Ming, 2003. "CSSTP is Not Only About Black Box." 8/1, *Apple Daily*. <http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20130801/35190837/>

result table of a model with multiplicative interaction terms (Brambor et al., 2006), visualization of the conditional effect and the conditional standard errors of nationalism is more illustrative.³² The effects of the interaction terms are visualized in Figure 2.

The figure shows that, first, among people who strongly perceive that inequality is getting worse in the society, being a nationalist significantly increases one's support for the Sunflower Movement. In other words, more nationalist individuals are more responsive to sociotropic conditions. This holds true for all nationalistic individuals who are either more attached to Taiwan or anti-China. Among people who are very proud to be Taiwanese, perceiving inequality as a pressing issue, as opposed to those who do not, increases one's predicted evaluation toward the Sunflower Movement from 1.90 to 6.40 (on a 10-point scale). In the same vein, among people who are more anti-China, if they also perceive rising inequality at the societal level, their support for the Sunflower Movement jumps from 1.36 to 8.04.

Second, in the context of the Sunflower Movement, inequality perception has a much

³² In a model with multiplicative interaction terms, there are several potential problems with the usual reported result tables, making it more difficult for people to interpret the results. First, the lower-order coefficients of an interaction term often describes a relationship outside the range of the actual data, so it is less straightforward to explain the result of a model. Second, the coefficient of the interaction term can be misleading too. In Brambor et al. (2006, p.74), they show that it is entirely plausible "for the marginal effect of X on Y to be significant for substantively relevant values of the modifying variable Z even if the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificant." See Braumoeller (2004); Brambor et al. (2006).

bigger modifying effect for national chauvinism than for national attachment. As long as people agree and perceive that inequality is getting worse in the society (regardless of the degree of how strong their perceptions are), being highly anti-China significantly increases one's support level for the Sunflower Movement than those who are less anti-China. In contrast, in the case of national attachment, the modifying effect of inequality is only significant among people who strongly agree that inequality is a serious problem in the society. This limited conditional effect explains why the interaction term *Taiwanese Pride*Inequality* is insignificant because the coefficient of the interaction term is the average effect across all inequality perception. Even though the conditional effect of national attachment is present only among people who firmly believe that inequality is a social issue, it is still substantively important as more than 66% of the respondents have this level of concern in our survey.

To prove that the effect of nationalism is conditional on sociotropic views instead of egocentric views, we also include the interaction terms between *Nationalism* and *Egocentric Views*; we run another model in which *Anti-China Feelings*Education* and *Taiwanese Pride*Education* are included. Model 3 and Figure 3 display the results. To start with, we find that people's evaluation of the movement is not driven by considerations of individual benefits. Moreover, the effect of nationalism is not contingent on these egocentric factors as

well. In Figure 3, neither the impact of *Anti-China Feelings* nor that of *Taiwanese Pride* is mediated by education levels.³³

In sum, in forming trade preferences with China, the Taiwanese people take into account the distributional effect at the societal level; the more individual cares about the distributional effect, the more concerns he/she has toward signing a trade agreement with China and hence higher supports he/she has toward the Sunflower Movement. Moreover, such effect is contingent on the level of nationalism. Nationalistic people care the most about the distributional effect of inequality. Therefore, if nationalists feel that inequality is getting worse in Taiwan, they show the highest support toward the Sunflower Movement.³⁴

Conclusion

We use an original survey to illustrate main factors that influence people's support for the Sunflower Movement, an unprecedented event that might profoundly influence future individual political behavior in Taiwan. The findings are as follows: first, nationalism plays

³³ Concerning the control variables, people who live in urban cities (*Urban*) or the capital city (*Taipei*) do not have trade preferences different from people outside the big cities. The effect of age is highly associated with the support for the movement; one year older is associated with a decrease of 0.04 in the support level.

³⁴ In addition, we specify a model in which the *overall trade openness support* is the dependent variable (Model 4 in Table 3 in the online appendix). Our estimation result provides scientific evidence to refute this claim that the social basis for this movement is simply people who are in general opposed to trade openness. Please see the online appendix for a detailed analysis.

a significant role, and we depart from existing literature by distinguishing the various dimensions of nationalism and their distinctive influences on the preferences of socio-economic exchanges with China. This paper tests the effects of national pride, chauvinism, and feelings towards China. We find that people who dislike China tend to support the movement. Moreover, this effect still holds even after we add the national pride variable, indicating that disliking China and being proud of Taiwan are two unique effects. On national pride, we find that individuals who have higher levels of national attachment also demonstrate higher levels of support for the movement. This finding is important because the previous literature on Taiwanese politics seldom uses national pride as an explanatory variable.

Furthermore, the effect of nationalism is stronger among people who are concerned about the inequality situation in Taiwan. We argue that because when people are more nationalistic, they care more about the potential impact of a specific policy on the society. Nationalism sentiment brings in emotions generated by the “functional relationship” between one’s country and another, making the social issues more salient to people (Huddy and Khatib, 2007). This conditional effect does not occur for the egocentric concerns. The impact of the personal endowment, proxied by educational levels, does not vary when people have various level of nationalism sentiment.

In sum, these results show us that it is necessary to disentangle various components of nationalism and further investigate their effects on individuals' political behaviors. Nationalism may be an important determinant when Taiwanese form their preferences on the socio-economic exchanges with China and social events related to this issue. Moreover, the sociotropic view, which has been a strong predictor of voting behaviors, might be moderated by nationalism. We suggest that future surveys should start to include different measurements of nationalism because the traditional Taiwanese-identity variable is apparently not the best proxy for nationalist sentiments.

Besides the attitude toward the Sunflower Movement, we also find that higher levels of Taiwanese pride significantly lead to more support for trade openness in general. Unlike previous literature that argues nationalism and trade openness are always a negative association (e.g., Solt, 2011), this paper demonstrates that the direction of the association between nationalism and trade openness support is contingent on the national context. In Taiwan, where the export-oriented industry is the main engine of economic growth, higher degrees of trade openness is considered as benefiting the nation by more nationalist Taiwanese. This requires extra work for a more clear explanation.

More broadly, the paper serves as an important avenue to understand how Taiwanese people view cross-Strait relations and a closer tie with China in general. We show that the

Sunflower Movement is not merely an anti-China movement. The China factor does exist, but there are still unanswered questions in the literature as well as in Taiwanese politics and cross-Strait relations that require further research. For example, what are factors that attribute to the loving Taiwan and anti-China sentiments? As a critical event that has the potential to influence political attitudes of many people, more research is needed.

Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Distribution of the Dependent Variable




Table 1: Correlation Table between Identity, National Attachment, Anti-China Feelings, and National Chauvinism

	Taiwanese Identity	Taiwanese Pride	Anti-China Feelings	National Chauvinism
Taiwanese Identity	1			
Taiwanese Pride	0.16	1		
Anti-China Feelings	0.48	0.16	1	
National Chauvinism	0.05	0.42	0.00	1

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std.	Min	Max
Sunflower Movement Evaluation	831	5.82	3.18	1	10
Income	799	10.91	5.20	1	22
Education	829	16.53	2.98	6	32
Inequality Perception	826	4.58	0.67	1	5
Anti-China Feelings	831	1.73	2.47	-6.8	7.6
Taiwanese Pride	831	7.97	1.92	1	10
National Chauvinism	829	3.89	0.92	1	5
Taiwanese Identity	831	0.59	0.49	0	1
Unification/Independence	826	2.23	0.68	1	3
Urban	831	0.42	0.49	0	1
Taipei	831	0.15	0.36	0	1
Age	831	41.15	11.58	20	82

Table 3: The Estimation Result

	Model 1: Baseline	Model 2: Interaction Term (Sociotropic) ^a	Model 3: Interaction Term (Egocentric) ^b
DV	Movement Evaluation	Movement Evaluation	Movement Evaluation
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS
Anti-China Feelings	0.330*** (0.04)	0.332*** (0.04)	0.198 (0.196)
Taiwanese Pride	0.120* (0.05)	0.117* (0.05)	0.257 (0.20)
National Chauvinism	-0.017 (0.1)	-0.007 (0.1)	-0.02 (0.1)
Taiwanese Identity	1.547*** (0.2)	1.548*** (0.2)	1.542*** (0.21)
Pro-Unification (reference group: the status quo)	-0.416 (0.26)	-0.459+ (0.25)	-0.419 (0.26)
Pro-Independence (reference group: the status quo)	1.611*** (0.2)	1.546*** (0.2)	1.610*** (0.2)
Urban	-0.275 (0.17)	-0.271 (0.17)	-0.276 (0.17)
Taipei	0.293 (0.24)	0.252 (0.24)	0.288 (0.24)
Education	0.008 (0.03)	0.008 (0.03)	0.620 (0.10)
Income	-0.016 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.02)	-0.016 (0.02)
Inequality Perception	0.769*** (0.13)	0.961*** (0.14)	0.762*** (0.13)

Age	-0.014+	-0.015*	-0.013+
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Anti-China*Inequality		0.131**	
		(0.05)	
Pride*Inequality		0.057	
		(0.06)	
Anti-China*Education			0.008
			(0.01)
Pride*Education			-0.009
			(0.01)
_cons	0.055***	5.09***	-0.782
	(0.91)	(0.61)	(1.75)
R-sq	0.515	0.521	0.515
BIC	3575	3578	3587
N	786	786	786

Figure 2: Effect of Nationalism Contingent on Sociotropic Views





Figure 3: Effect of Nationalism Contingent on Self-Interest



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